

C. J. Ruijgh, *Autour de 'τε épique'*. Etudes sur la syntaxe grecque. Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1971, 1082 pp.

Reviewed by R. S. P. Beekes, Prinsenlaan 23, Oegstgeest, The Netherlands.

In reviewing this voluminous study I restrict myself to a discussion of the central topic, leaving aside the chapters on aspect and other more general issues.

The author decided that it was necessary to study the 800 occurrences of *τε épique* in detail in order to develop a general theory. In doing so he felt obliged to add not

only chapters on Homeric problems in general and on co- and subordination, but also on tempora and modi. Then follow seven chapters on $\tau\epsilon$ after relative ($\delta\varsigma \tau\epsilon$ etc.) and five after coordinative elements ($\delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\epsilon$ etc.). $\text{Ἡ} \tau\epsilon$, interrogatives + $\tau' \acute{\alpha}\rho'$ and the conjunction $\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon$ are treated separately, concluded by a chapter on problematical instances of $\tau\epsilon$. The occurrences in epic comparisons and in typical descriptions and general truths are considered together. The last five chapters discuss $\tau\epsilon$ after Homer. The author has done well to present his own theory, and a summary of the whole book, first (a preliminary version appeared in *Mnemosyne* 22 (1969) 1-66). It is directly followed by a discussion of the views of ancient and modern grammarians. (This clear structure is not immediately evident from the table of contents.)

The author starts from the observation that $\tau\epsilon$ as a rule introduces digressions without which the preceding is syntactically and semantically complete, i.e. it is non-determinative. And secondly, that this digression gives a non-individual, not temporally limited fact, but one of general validity ("fait permanent"). $\tau\epsilon$, then, is essentially an adverb of digressive-permanent value. It is stressed that one or the other of these two elements has been recognized by earlier scholars. G. Hermann, for example, stated in 1805: "*Ἡ* $\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon$ notioni, quae iam definita essedebet, aliud quid addit, quod ad ipsam notionem non est necessarium". However, their general theories did not account for the two essential elements together (hardly ever for one of them). Often the actual value assigned was too vague. Sharply rejected is the equation with Latin *-que* in *quisque*. It is objected that ($\acute{\omega}\varsigma$) $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\epsilon$ is in fact $\acute{\omega}\varsigma \tau\epsilon$ with $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ added, not essentially $\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma \tau\epsilon$; that $\delta\varsigma \tau\epsilon$ with the value of $\delta\varsigma \tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ is very rare; that the occurrence in general truths does not mean that $\tau\epsilon$ had an indefinite value; that the normal digressive anaphorical relative use excludes an indefinite value. This theory must surely be abandoned.

The clear definition of the value established by the author is important enough, but also an explanation of its origin is given. It had been observed (e.g. by Gonda) that coordinative $\tau\epsilon$, as opposed to $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$, is used mostly with closely connected elements ($\mu\acute{\iota}\chi\eta \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \tau\epsilon$). The author thinks that this stable connection ("liaison stable") explains that $\tau\epsilon$ expresses a permanent fact, while it also explains its digressive character: it adds something that is closely connected, i.e. that is generally true, which can be added or not. This means that e.g. T 259 *Ἐρινύες, αἷ θ' ὑπὸ γαίαν ἀνθρώπους τίνυνται* from an originally coordinative "and those who" came to mean "c'est-à-dire celles qui". I must say that in an instance like this I find such a development rather hard to believe, but it is very natural in e.g. B 471 *ἄρη ἐν εἰαρινῇ, ὅτε τε γλάγος ἄγγεα δέυει* "dans la saison printanière et (c'est à dire) au temps où le lait inonde les vases". The author himself admits, en passant, on p. 423 that the development with $\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon$ is easier to understand than with $\delta\varsigma \tau\epsilon$. As this hypothesis easily explains all elements, it must be correct. It happens that it also provides a date. As $\tau\epsilon$ could only have got this special value (the "liaison stable") after the introduction of $\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}$ as the normal coordinative, it must be post-Mycenaean. Even an internal chronology is possible. While there are no formulas with $\delta\varsigma \tau\epsilon$, there are such with $\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon \tau\epsilon$, so that the latter may be older. Also $\delta\acute{\epsilon} \tau\epsilon$ can only have come into being when $\tau\epsilon$ had become well established as an adverb, so that this group must be one of the most recent. Also Mycenaean shows that it is different from the $-\tau\epsilon$ in temporal conjunctions, as $\acute{\omicron}\tau\epsilon$ has a $-t-$ in Mycenaean: *ote*.

First the Mycenaean use of *-k^ue* and *-de* is discussed. As to the type *ekeqe/lekhei-k^ue/* 'and he has' following a nominative, it is convincingly argued that the nominative represents a sentence. Interesting is the comparison of the Mycenaean (and Indo-European) situation of *-k^ue* versus asyndeton, with the classical Greek *καί* versus *-τε*, of which the second member expresses a stable connection ("liaison stable"), §210.

Then lists are given in §§ 288–289, more detailed ones §§ 293–295. Though the relation Iliad: Odyssey = 4:3, this is not because the latter is more recent. Rather it is due to the tendency to agglomerate. (E.g. *ω* had epic *τε* 1:92 but only 2 agglomerations, *χ* 1:27 but 14 agglomerations). The order in which the occurrences are discussed is: relative + *τε* (*ὅς/ὅτε* – with *ὅς ῥά τε*, *ὅς πέρ τε* etc. –, local and temporal relative adverb, *οἷος/ὅσσος/ὡς τε*), coordinative + *τε* (*δέ*, *γάρ*, *μέν*, *καί*, *ἀλλά τε*). In the separate chapters all occurrences are discussed, all variant readings, etc. Irregular uses are discussed, so the "manifestation isolée d'un fait permanent dans une situation temporaire" (e.g. K 278 *Διὸς τέκος, ἥ τέ μοι αἰεὶ ... παρίστασαι*). It does not seem possible or useful to discuss them here. I may mention a few points.

When *ὅς τε* and *ὅς* without *τε* are compared, it appears that in comparisons *τε* is normal (68:10 without), while in geographical digressions it is much less frequent (2:10 without). The author states that in the first case mostly iterative facts are mentioned of which it is not known whether they occur at that time ("comme une petite fille, qui court à côté de sa mère ..."). Geographical facts of course are continuous. The two types are called "inactualisable" and "actualisable". It is said that "le caractère permanent d'un fait inactualisable est plus clair dans son contexte que celui d'un fait actualisable" (p. 383). It is then concluded that *τε* seems to stress "le caractère inactualisable". This is not clear to me: there can hardly be a fact more permanent than a continuous, permanent geographical fact. Also I do not understand the terms (I would rather call them "actualisable"(!) and "actuel/actualisé"). The conclusion is not explained but has to be taken as a new "facette". I think that the different frequency can be explained easily, when we realize that the absolutely permanent "faits permanents", the geographical facts, need not be marked as permanent, while in the case of the discontinuous facts it is useful to characterize them as permanent.

Of the many details presented I might mention the suggestion that *ἄρα* originally means (Fr.) 'bien' and is related to *ἄριστος* as *μάλα* to *μάλιστα*. The author opposes (p. 433, n. 76) Latte's rejection of Cypr. *έρ*. I might add that, if *μάλα μάλιστα* represent **m₁h₂-(e, -is)-*, *ἄρα* could continue **rh₂-e*, and *έρ(α)* < **erh₂-e* (and in the same way *ἄρι-*, *έρι-* < **rh₂-i*, and **erh₂i-*). However, this would prohibit connection with *ἀρείων* (and *ἄριστος*), if this has a root *ἄρε-* from **h₂erh₁-* (Myc. *arjoh-* can have **h₂erh₁iōs-*, but hardly **rh₂-iōs*). Of course, this is a phonetical possibility only. The author does not comment on Lith. *iř*, *ař*.

Though *ἦ τε* has an adverbial *τε*, this *τε* has a different value. In one third of its instances it occurs in an apodosis (not in a digression) expressing not a "fait permanent" but a more or less hypothetical fact (II 687 *εἰ δὲ ἔπος Πηληιάδαο φύλαξεν, ἦ τ' ἄν ὑπέκφυγε κῆρα*); there is no "lien stable", there is mostly change of subject (which is not normally found with adverbial *τε*). Therefore the author very probably assumes that the combination *ἦ τε* dates from the time when *τε* was the normal

connective, which could also be used in situations suggesting a contrasting interpretation ('and yet', as is also still found in *ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε*). ⁹It stresses the reality, the group originally meaning 'et (pourtant) il est vrai que'. (I do not see why N 631 is an exception: *Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἧ τέ σέ φασι περὶ φρένας ἔμμεναι ἄλλων*. I think that it is most simple to assume that, in this emotional expression (shown by the vocative), a sentence like "I cannot understand" is suppressed. Note that, with regard to *τίς τ' ἄρ* the author remarks (p. 805): "La suppression du premier membre fait naître la force expressive de l'interrogation". I think that this is also the natural interpretation of P 171, where the author thinks that a vocative is "inserted" and *ἧ τε* refers to the preceding sentence.)

Also in the combination interrogative + *τ' ἄρ* (*τίς, τί, πῶς* etc.) *τε* has no digressive-permanent value. We must explain it from *τε* as the normal connective. It expresses the impatience of the question.

The existence of a conjunction *ὄτε* '(the fact) that, because' is denied, because *ὄ* and *ὄτι* in this function derived from their use as autonomous relatives, while *ὄς τε* is never used in that way. Also, we never find "faits permanents" in these cases. The author shows that all supposed cases (some twenty) contain the temporal conjunction *ὄτε*. He demonstrates that it developed a causal nuance: *νῦν δ' ὄτε δή* 'now that'; *νῦν ... ὄτε* 'now ... that'; - ... *ὄτε* '- ... , now that > (because) now > because (now)'. This is found in most of the cases concerned. In fact this conjunction was posited by Bekker in 1858 (the ancient grammarians did not acknowledge it), from whom it was generally taken over, though M. P. Nilsson and Delbrück rejected it. Recently Monteil accepted it only for E 331 *ὁ δὲ Κύπριν ἐπύχετο νηλεὶ χαλκῷ, γινώσκων, ὅτ' ἀναακίς ἔην θεός*, and v 333 *νῦν δ' ἤδη τόδε δηλον, ὅτ' οὐκέτι φύκτὰ πέλουται* 'Et alors ils s'en rendaient compte, lorsqu'il n'était plus possible de fuir' shows that it is quite possible to understand the use of (temporal) *ὄτε* in the two verses cited. The author's interpretation is entirely convincing.

In conclusion it can be said that the problem seems definitively solved now thanks to the patience and the insight of the author. One might ask whether it was necessary to write so large a book, but - apart from so many other questions treated - it might be feared that a short exposé would not have convinced the readers and that it was necessary for once to present all the material. It must be added that it is a very readable book.